THE STRATEGIC INSIGHTS OF BOKO HARAM & ASSESSMENT

ETHELBERT ONEY, INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY EXPERT

Peace process and concessions are much abused terms. 

In many contexts, they are used to mean predetermined counter- terrorism ideological solutions. 

As strategic mechanisms, they have been adopted in Israeli-Palestine relationship, Northern Ireland, Colombia and Mali. However, the only successful one was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) concession in 2005. 

The news of ceasefire by the Boko Haram terrorist group is a long awaited development that should be embraced with open arm as long as it is genuine. 

The Boko Haram started as a religious terrorist group that adopted violence to further what it sees as divinely commanded purposes. 

This ideology stem from the preaching of Mohammed Yusuf’s father far before the sect came to existence in 2002, which often targeted broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. 

This group gradually graduated to a sectional terrorist group, clamoring for a separate Islamic state or seeking the Islamisation of the entire nation. 

The constant attacks unleashed by the sect gave rise to focuses on counter-terrorism for the first time.

Counter-terrorism is short-term in nature and is intended to mitigate the effectiveness and frequency of terrorist acts. This has been the primary focus of our law enforcement community generally and that of the nation, specifically. 

The notion of a long term strategy to deal with Boko Haram and its affiliates may include a familiar peace process, concession or absolute defeat through high quality intelligence gathering. 

Peace process or concession may provide a plethora of tools that not only deal with the symptoms of terrorism, but also the root causes that will allow a long-term strategy to be developed.

In order to effectively devise a means for a long-term strategic focus and insight to combat Boko Haram through peace process or concession, it is necessary to try and form a policy framework, for instance, prevention, persuasion, denial and coordination, which we have been shying away from.

The prevention strategy should centre on the general notion of adequately dealing with legitimate grievances. 

In order to reduce the disposition of disgruntled Boko Haram, the notion of prevention should revolve around exposing their sponsors and the political oxygen it uses. This can help in dealing with both the root causes and motivations at the same time. 

The reason this preventive strategy is very imperative is that it can be used to stop this group from further violence against innocent citizens. 

This transition should require an institutional and cultural attitude that will be nurtured and embraced by both parties by effectively mitigating the symptoms of radicalization and recruitment through brainwashing.

The second strategy, persuasion should aim to delegitimize and discredit Boko Haram organization and sponsors by eliminating the logistical and financial support base they use to muster their capabilities and reach. 

When a country is faced with threats such as we now do, it is necessary to exhaust all counterterrorism options available before engaging the military. Concession or peace process in reality is a complex counter-terrorism mechanism, which had rarely and effectively worked as expected with the exception of the IRA under the Tony Blair administration in Britain and Colombia.

The third strategy denial, is a core consideration if properly employed through a complementary process relying on effective counterterrorism strategy, while maintaining certain inalienable freedoms. 

Denial is the quintessential dimension for counter-terrorism operation. It serves to harden as many potential targets as possible, interrupt terrorist financial and logistical support, and disrupt terrorists’ operational networks through effective cooperation and security operative’s visibility.

The final strategy, coordination, involves the coordination of the various intelligence and security services as they target to combat Boko Haram, as well as synchronization and reconstruction efforts at all levels. 

This strategy is the culmination of tying together the tactics of counter-terrorism with the tools of lasting solution. Peace process or concession should be in our agenda because our intelligence gathering capabilities, threat assessment and our counter- terrorism methodologies, have made less progress than anticipated. They have moved towards nationalist terrorist agenda by taken over few areas in the Northeast. It is time we reevaluate our existing strategies and go back to the drawing board with high expectation.

The above mentioned framework, if properly applied, will allow for an effective solution to combat Boko Haram and its sponsors without undermining due process and the rule of law.

 Although, there must be a strong will power between both parties to initiate and sustain a peace process or concession. A key requirement should be for at least a minimal degree of bipartisan consensus in favor of the mechanisms among the major political parties in the legislature.

 However, in the process of attempting to mobilize initial support for peace initiatives and sustaining the momentum crucial for success, a peace movement with genuine mass support, as transparent and broadly base as possible, will be of inestimable value. For most nations, the standard policy is no concessions or peace process resolution. 

This position has always been strongly advocated primarily because of the reasoning that bargaining invites repeated attacks. A reasonable amount of terrorism practitioners, scholars and academicians disagree with this belief including the author. Is it not wise never to say never?

ETHELBERT ONEY, INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY EXPERT  08067764342